HTCONDOR-2021-0003
Summary: |
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Using standard command-line tools, a user with only READ access to a SchedD or Collector can discover secrets that could allow them to control other users jobs and/or read their data. |
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Access Required: |
READ access to HTCondor daemons |
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An attacker need only have READ-level authorization to a vulnerable daemon. This means they are able to run tools like condor_q or condor_status. Many pools do not require authentication for READ-level commands so it is likely that an attacker could execute this command remotely from an untrusted network, unless otherwise prevented by a firewall or other network-level access controls. |
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Effort Required: |
Medium |
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An attacker would need to write custom tools and be very familiar with the HTCondor wire protocols to carry out a succesful attack. |
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Impact/Consequences: |
High |
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This attack allows a user to control a running job submitted by another user. This could let them read that job's data and/or inject their own executables into that job that would then run as that user. |
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Workaround: |
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There is no workaround for this issue. |
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Full Details: |
Embargoed until future notice. |